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Abstract 
We characterize coordinated bidding strategies in two cases: a weak cartel, in which the bidders 
cannot make side-payments; and a strong cartel, in which the cartel members can exclude new 
entrants and can make ttansfer payments. The weak cartel can do no better than have its 
members submit identical bids. The strong canel in effect reauctions the good among the cartel 
members. 
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I. Introduction 
A successful cartel must overcome at least four obstacles. First, the conspirators must dev­
ise some mechanism for dividing the spoils. Each cartel member has an incentive to argue for a 
bigger share. Second, an agreement is worthless without some way of enforcing it. Since con­
tracts to fix prices cannot usually be written, any collusive agreement must be designed to be 
self-enforcing. Third, collusion contains the seeds of its own destruction. The high profits earned 
in a successfully colluding industry attract new firms into the industry; the competition from 
those new entrants then tends to destroy the collusive arrangements. Fourth, the victims of the 
cartel, on the other side of the market, may take actions to destabilize it. The first of these prob­
lems is empirically at least as important as the other three: for example, in a sample of interna­
tional cartels that were temporarily successful but then broke down, almost a half were des­
troyed by internal squabbling over how to share the profits (Eckbo, 1976, ch.3). 
The main subject of this paper is how cartels overcome the first of these difficulties, in the 
specific context of bidding at auctions.1 The colluding bidders must overcome an adverse­
selection problem: they do not know how much each of their fellow cartel members is willing to 
pay for the item being sold. We shall derive the optimal mechanism for the cartel to use to 
decide who receives the item and how the proceeds are distributed. Our model will also have 
something to say about the third and fourth cartel problems listed above: entry deterrence and 
active seller responses. We shall, however, have nothing to add to what has already been said 
about the problem of cartel enforcement (see, for example, Stigler, 1964, Abreu, Pearce and 
Stacchetti, 1986). 
We examine all-inclusive bidder cartels at sealed-bid first price auctions.2 Our analysis will 
explain two commonly observed forms of cartel organization. One set of results is about weak 
cartels, by which we mean cartels whose members are unable to make transfer payments among 
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mit exactly the same bid. This may explain why, in the bidding for government contracts, it is 
often the case that all bids are identical to the last cent. The second set of results is about strong 
cartels: cartels that can both make transfer payments and exclude new entrants. A co1nmon 
method by which a cartel decides which bidder is to get the item and the size of the transfers is 
to hold its own illicit auction. Our model will show that this is an optimal mechanism for the car­
tel. 
While explicit collusion is illegal in the United States, the legality of implicit collusion is 
ambiguous; lawyers are still discussing the nature of the evidence that is needed in order to 
prosecute for collusion. Even if it is illegal, implicit collusion is more difficult to detect and 
prove than explicit collusion. Thus, although we shall find that a cartel that makes transfer pay­
ments among its members is more profitable than one that does not, bidders may prefer to col­
lude implicitly if the risk of detection and the severity of punishment of explicit collusion (not 
modeled here) are sufficiently great. 
In terms of the amounts of money involved, some of the most significant cases of collusion 
occur in the bidding for government contracts.3 Although our model will be expressed in terms 
of selling, with appropriate sign changes it can easily be converted into a model of contract bid­
ding. 
2. Enforcement 
In order to collude the bidders must resolve their asymmetric-infonnation problem: they 
must have some way of selecting a winner and a winning bid. We model this by supposing that 
the bidders use a mechanism: that is, a decision rule that, based on the bidders' reports, assigns 
bids and (in some cases) transfers. The phases-of-the-moon systen1 used by the electrical­
equipment conspiracy (Smith (1961)) is an example of a mechanism. By the Revelation Princi­
ple (Myerson(1985)), we may without loss of generality restrict attention to direct, incentive-
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compatible mechanism, in which each bidder reports his valuation to the mechanism and has 
incentives to do so honestly. A direct mechanism, then, takes the vector of the bidders' reports of 
valuations and dictates bids and (perhaps) transfers to each bidder. We shall assume that the car­
tel designs the mechanism to maximize the ex ante (before the valuations are known) sum of 
bidders' expected profits in the auction. 
The seller's behavior is passive. The seller announces a reserve price, and sells at the 
highest bid to the highest bidder. In the event of a tie, the seller is presumed to randomize 
equally over the bidders with the highest bid. It will transpire that such behavior on the part of 
the seller, which is employed in most government procurement auctions, is not a best response 
against the existence of a cartel. Therefore, we are assuming that the seller does not know he 
faces a cartel, or is bound to the rules of the sealed bid auction by law. 
The model we develop is static: it focuses on behavior in a single auction. However, the 
cartel rules require an enforcement mechanism, for there will be an individual incentive to 
defect. Although we shall consider various kinds of cartel mechanisms, it will turn out that the 
mechanism works by assigning either a maximum amount that any n1ember may bid, or (in the 
case in which side-payments are possible) the identity of the winner and the designated winner's 
bid. In either case, the information necessary to implement an enforce1nent strategy --- that is , to 
detect deviations from actions the mechanism prescribes --- is at most the identity and bid of the 
winning bidder. We shall assume that these two pieces of information become public. This 
information is made available, by law, in government procurement auctions4 (with the exception 
of certain Department of Defense projects). 
The enforcement needed to ensure that the members comply with the cartel mechanism can 
come from one of two sources. First, the cartel may hire an enforcer who punishes any observed 
deviating bidders --- an organized-crime approach. The alternative avenue is to appeal to a grim 
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trigger strategy in an infinitely repeated auction context 5(Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti, 1986). 
Although we do not model dynamics explicitly, it is clear that cooperation is one of the equili­
bria in the infinitely repeated noncooperative game. A deviating bidder can be threatened with 
noncooperative profit levels in all future auctions should he win the current auction when the 
mechanism dictated otherwise. This threat will be sufficient to deter deviations if discounting is 
sufficiently low. Although maximal profits are only one equilibrium among a plethora of 
repeated-game equilibria (Friedman, 1986), a cartel that is choosing its mechanism has an obvi­
ous incentive to coordinate on this equilibrium. 
Anecdotal evidence from antiques and artwork auctions indicates that retaliatory strategies 
are in fact used to enforce collusion: "When one of the members of the ring goes against his 
partners ... , or the ring falls out for one reason or another, then it works very much to the seller's 
advantage as vindicative competition leads to crazy prices" (Cooper, 1977, pp 37 - 38). Simi­
larly, retaliation in subsequent auctions was the enforcement mechanism used by the electrical­
equipment conspiracy (Smith, 1961, p. 175) and by highway-construction cartels (Flax, 1983, p. 
80). 
We assume, therefore, that some punishment is available to the cartel, so that no cartel 
member will ever disregard the mechanism when the mechanism dictates that he bid to lose. Our 
primary interest is in examining the constraints on the cartel that result from the privacy of the 
cartel members' information. Therefore, the model to be developed endows the cartel with the 
ability to ensure obedience to the cartel mechanism's orders; but not with the ability to prevent 
any cartel member from lying to the cartel mechanism, except insofar as the cartel mechanism 
can be designed so as to make honesty optimal. 
- 6 -
3. Modelling Issues
We suppose a unique item is to be sold by sealed-bid auction to one of a set of risk-neutral 
bidders. The distinctive feature of an auction is asymmetric information: if the seller knew the 
bidders' demands, he would simply post a price. We model the asymmetry of information by 
assuming that bidder i, i = 1, .. .,n, knows his own willingness to pay, vi, while all the other 
bidders and the seller perceive vi as an independent draw from a cumulative distribution F. 
Assume F has a differentiable density /with support [0, 1]. 
The assumption of independent draws, which is ubiquitous in the mechanism-design litera-
ture, rules out correlated valuations, and therefore may make the model inapplicable to some 
real-world auctions in which collusion occurs. For example, if the perceived value of a piece of 
an depends on its unknown future value, and the bidders' predictions of the future value are 
correlated, then this model does not apply (Milgrom and Weber, 1982). However, the 
independent-private-values assumption is not inconsistent with there being some factors that 
influence all bidders' valuations. For example, if the determinants of the artwork's future price 
are known and equally weighted by all of the bidders, the independence assumption is satisfied. 
Also, if the actual value is vi =p +wi, where Wi represents the bidder's personal valuation of the 
item and p is its unknown future market price, the same for all bidders and independent of the 
wi 's, then the independent-private-values model still applies. Thus the analysis to follow applies 
to situations with common-value elements, provided all the bidders have the same information 
about the common aspects. 
A further reason for focusing on the independent-private-values case is that, in the pure 
common-value case, the optimal cartel mechanism is simple if the cartel members can communi-
cate with each other. In the pure common-value case, efficiency is attained regardless of which 
bidder wins. The cartel can therefore use some exogenous method to pick which of its members 
is to win. It then asks each bidder to report his private information about the item's true value. 
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Since the report does not affect the probability of winning, there is no incentive to misrepresent 
this information. Based on the pooled information, the cartel decides \vhether the expected value 
of the item exceeds the reserve price; if it does, the assigned bidder bids the reserve price 
without competition(cf. McAfee, McMillan and Reny, 1989). 
The cartel mechanism works as follows. After the bidders have reported their valuations to 
the mechanism, the ith bidder is awarded the good with probability hj(Vj, v_i), where v_i 
represents the vector of others' reports (equal to true values in equilibrium). Bidder i's expected 
profit, if he has value vi but reports Wj, is 
(1) 1tj = E_1(vihi(w1,v-i) -Ti(wi, v_1)}, 
where E_1 is the expectation over v -i and Ti is the expected payment by bidder i. If transfers are 
prohibited, Ti is the bid weighted by the probability of winning. If transfers are allowed, Ti is 
the weighted bid plus the net transfer. From Guesnerie and Laffont (1984), incentive compatibil-
ity is equivalent to6: 
(2) 
and 
(3) 
dni = E_ihi(v1, v_1) dvi 
a -;-- E_jhj(Vj, V_j) � 0.
!J Vj 
On a priori grounds, one can imagine four kinds of collusive mechanism, defined by the 
instruments available. Listed roughly in order of ease of detection by outsiders, these are: first, 
the tacit mechanism, in which there are no transfers and the ith bidder's bid depends only on his 
own valuation; second, the coordinative mechanism, in which there are no transfers but the bids 
may depend upon the entire vector of reports; third, the transfer mechanism, which has side-
payments, but they must sum to zero for every realization of the vector of valuations; and fourth, 
the budget-breaking mechanism, in which the side-payment constraint is relaxed so that transfers 
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need sum to zero only on average. Tacit collusion is probably legal in the United States, and is 
in any case probably undetectable, since no contact among the bidders is needed to operate the 
mechanism. The bidders need not even know who the other bidders are. A coordinative collusion 
runs some risk of detection since the communications might be intercepted. Transfers generate 
an additional potential source of evidence. Finally, a budget-breaking collusion is still more 
risky, as it must employ a third party (the budget-breaker) who does not value the item being 
sold. We shall investigate all four types of cartel (although, as we shall find, there are actually 
only two different types, defined by the presence or absence of transfers).7 
In the next two sections we shall take as given the seller's policy: the seller offers to sell 
the item by sealed bid to the highest bidder, provided the bid exceeds some announced level r. 
This may be a reserve price set either at the lowest possible valuation that a bidder could have, 
or at the seller's own valuation of the item, or at some level higher than the seller's valuation so 
as to exploit the seller's monopoly power. Alternatively (and in some cases more realistically), r 
might represent the cartel members' shared perception of how low a bid they can get away with, 
without either causing the seller to refuse to sell or arousing the suspicion of the antitrust author-
ities. We shall for brevity call r the minimum price, and we assume it is known to all bidders. 
4. Weak Cartels 
For the first result of this section, we assume the cartel operates under a handicap: the cartel 
members are unable to make transfer payments to each other. We leave this restriction unex-
plained, but one reason might be that transfers give rise to a risk of prosecution by the antitrust 
authorities that is sufficient to induce the cartel members to eschew their use. 
The cartel mechanism is efficient provided bidder i wins if and only if his value exceeds 
both the minimum price and all the other bidders' values. The latter occurs with probability 
F(vi)n-l. Hence efficiency is characterized by 
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[F(v;)n-1 , vi::=:r (4) E__ ihi(vi, v_;) = 0, vi<r. 
A profit-maximizing cartel clearly has an interest in achieving efficiency, so that the pie to 
be divided among the members is as large as possible. However, we shall find that the impossi-
bility of transfers prevents efficient collusion. The bidder who values the item the most does not 
necessarily get it: collusion is inherently limited. 
Lemma: If a cartel member whose value is less than or equal to the minimum price r is con­
strained to earn zero profit, then efficiency implies noncooperative profit levels.8 
Assume that it is common knowledge that, in the event of two or more bidders being tied 
for the highest bid, the seller awards the good randomly, with equal likelihood to each of the 
bidders. 
Let H(v)=[l-F(v)]i/(v). We consider two cases. First, W(v) > 0 for all ve(O, l); and 
second, H" (v) < 0 for all ve(O, 1). The latter can be thought of as the more likely case, as it is 
satisfied by most common distributions. The expected value of H (v) (with expectations taken 
over the distribution of the highest valuation) is the expected rent earned by the winning bidder 
in a noncooperative auction (see McAfee and McMillan (1987) for details). Thus H(v) is an 
index of the winning bidder's profit in expected terms, and H"(v) < 0 implies that high value 
bidders produce relatively less profits. 
Theorem 1: Suppose transfers are impossible. In the case H" (v) > 0, optirnal implicit collusion 
involves noncooperative bidding. In the case H" (v) < 0, it has 
(5) B(v;. v_,) = [O, r, 
vi< r 
V1:2: r. 
Thus, if transfers are prohibited, optimal collusion (in the case H' (v) < 0) has every bidder who 
values the item at more than the minimum price submitting the same bid, namely the minimum 
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price. This is because, in the absence of side-payments, incentive con1patibility requires that the 
good be awarded stochastically, with equal probability to anyone whose value is larger than the 
minimum price: any attempt to arrange that the highest-value bidder wins generates incentives 
for the bidders to misstate their valuations. By submitting equal bids, the bidders in effect use 
the seller as their randomizing device. 
The mechanism in Theorem 1 works by having the bidders report their valuations to the 
mechanism (correctly, since incentive-compatibility constraints are imposed), and the mechan­
ism then recommends a bid to each bidder (which it is in the bidder's interest to adhere to). The 
proof of Theorem 1 allowed the mechanism to recommend bids that are a function of all bidders' 
reports. However, as Theorem 1 shows, this is not needed: each bid is a function of the bidder's 
own report alone. This means that the optimal mechanism can be in1plemented in a decentral -
ized way: the bidders need not actually report to the mechanism, but simply bid r if and only if 
their valuations exceed r. In this sense, although the analysis allows the possibility of coordina­
tion, the optimal mechanism can be implemented without coordination. 
Bidding according to the phases of the moon is an example of a correlated equilibrium. 
Can the cartel do better than using identical bidding by going to a correlated equilibrium? The 
answer is no. This is because our analysis allowed the bidders to communicate with the mechan­
ism. The set of equilibria in such a game includes the set of correlated equilibria: the Revela­
tion Principle picks out all correlated equilibria (Myerson (1985)). 
Collusion without transfers has two effects relative to noncooperative bidding. First, the 
payment to the seller is reduced. Second, the average valuation of the winning bidder is 
decreased, because the winner is no longer efficiently selected. The condition H'(v) < 0 
guarantees that the former effect outweighs the latter. 
For H' (v) > 0 for all v, it must be that the density function f (v) is sufficiently negatively 
sloped everywhere. While this is obviously unlikely to be satisfied, one c_ase in which it is has a 
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high probability of values being at or near the bottom end of the support, with a sharp and con­
tinuing falling off of probabilities thereafter. In this case the scheme (5) is not optimizing for the 
bidders. Another case for which intuition suggests identical bidding would break down occurs 
when the density function is such that, with high probability, a bidder's valuation is either very 
high or very low. In this case the monotonicity of H (v), assumed in Theorem 1, is violated. 
The theoretically optimal scheme (5) has a striking real-world counterpart. According to 
Scherer (1970, p.182), "Each year the federal and state governments receive thousands of sets of 
identical bids in the sealed bid competitions they sponsor." The pervasiveness of identical bid­
ding in U.S., Canadian, and European government contracting has been noted also by Comanor 
and Schankerman (1976), Cook (1963), Green (1980, pp.109-13), Hay and Kelley (1974), Mund 
(1960), and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (1976, p.20)9. Despite 
its prevalence, however, the phenomenon has not heretofore been satisfactorily explained. Why 
do the bidding firms choose such an easily detectable and apparently naive form of coordina­
tion? The answer, implied by Theorem 1, is that, given the asymmetry of information -- the 
firms cannot observe each other's production costs -- identical bidding is the best the cartel can 
do short of using side-payn1ents. 
We now consider an alternative (but, we shall show, equivalent) limitation on the bidders' 
ability to collude. This is based on the empirical observation that the most common reason for 
cartels to founder is their inability to prevent entry. We consider an extreme form of entry possi­
bilities. Suppose, in addition to the n serious bidders, there is a very large number of bidders with 
low values, values less than r, and that these low-value bidders cannot be identified directly fron1 
observation. If the cartel is open to anyone, these individuals would have an incentive to join, in 
order to participate in the cartel's sharing of profits, although they would never actually win an 
item. If there are enough of these individuals, the cartel must discourage them from claiming 
they are actually high-value-distribution types. One 1,vay to do this is to offer zero profits to 
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bidders with low values: 
(6) n;(r) = 0 .
Note that, if these nonserious bidders, or "schleppers", come from distributions which have 
a positive probability of values in excess of the reserve price, then one of them may be the 
efficient owner of the item, and should be included in the cartel. Because of the symmetry we 
have assumed, this environment is not encompassed by the present model. However, if the 
schleppers are drawn from a distribution with support below r, so that they have no effect on the 
noncooperative allocation, they may still desire to join the cartel. A cartel that faces sporadic 
real entry (by bidders who will receive draws from distribution F) may wish to design the 
mechanism to deter participation of schleppers. 
One justification for this is as follows. If there are infinitely many bidders with distribution 
G, with maximum r, a seller will never post a reserve price less than r, since someone is willing 
to pay r. If there are n bidders with valuations to be drawn from F (but not yet drawn), any one 
of these bidders would like to form a cartel that excludes the G type bidders, because they dissi­
pate the rents. If the distributional type cannot be identified, then 1ti(r) ::;; 0 is necessary.10 
Although this schlepper story is clearly an incomplete description of a cartel entry problem, 
the next theorem demonstrates the force of the entry-exclusion constraint (6). 
Theorem 2: If (6) holds, the bidder:! expected profits are maximized by the mechanisms of 
Theorem 1, even iftran�fers are possible.
Thus the no-entry constraint (bidders with value equal to the reserve price earn zero profits) 
means that side-payments are useless; the optimal mechanism can be implemented without 
transfers. 
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Theorems 1 and 2 establish a three-way equivalence among cartels (i) without transfers and 
without coordination; (ii) without transfers and with coordination; and (iii) with transfers but 
with zero profit at the reserve price. The intuition for this is that, first, the inability to make 
transfers implies that profit at the minimum price must be zero (because, without transfers, a 
bidder with value less than r who wins earns negative profit, so it is better for the cartel, maxim­
izing total expected profit, for such a bidder never to win). Second, profit at the nlinimum price 
being constrained to be zero implies that the maximum attainable cartel profit can be achieved 
without using transfers (because (6) implies that some bidders receive zero transfers; thus any 
transfer scheme cannot be lump-sum and the highest-valuation bidder who fails to receive a 
transfer has an incentive to overstate his valuation). 
Sometimes the cartel might choose a coordinated-bidding n1echanism instead of the 
identical-bidding mechanism of Theorem 1. This mechanism would have some device (such as 
the phases of the moon) to choose which bidder's turn it is to bid. This bidder is then asked if he 
wants the item at the pricer. If he does, he bids an amount r unopposed (or with token opposition 
-- "rival" bids less than r). If he does not want it, the next bidder on the list is asked. This was 
how the electrical-equipment conspiracy operated, for example. The total expected profits from 
this mechanism are the same as the identical-bidding mechanism, but in practice it requires more 
coordination, and has correspondingly greater risk of detection and prosecution. Comanor and 
Schankman (1976) found that rotating-bid arrangements were significantly more common in car­
tels with few members than in cartels with many members, reflecting the extra difficulties of set­
ting up and running a rotating-bid mechanism. There are, however, two situations in which a 
cartel would prefer a rotating-bid mechanism to identical bidding. First, identical bidding results 
in each bidder winning equal probability. Sometimes cartels seek a different division of the 
spoils from this. For example, in the electrical-equipment conspiracy, circuit-breaker contracts 
were allocated so that General Electric got 45%, Westinghouse 35%, and Allis-Chalmers and 
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Federal Pacific 10% each (Smith (1961, p. 137)). Since total profits are linear in the shares, such 
a mechanism still yields maximal total expected profits. The second reason for using rotating 
bids comes from the fact that, since the mechanism of Theorem 1 works by using the seller as a 
randomizing device, the seller can easily disrupt the mechanism by refusing to randomize. 
Instead of awarding the item arbitrarily when the bids are tied, the seller could announce a deter-
ministic tie-breaking rule: for example, he could award the item to the smallest firm bidding, or 
to the bidder whose name comes first in the alphabet. Then it would no longer be in the interest 
of bidders so discriminated against to remain in the cartel. The cartel members could defeat this 
ploy by rotating their bids. Mund (1960) cites some instances of bidders for government con-
tracts switching from an identical-bid mechanism to a rotating-bid mechanism after the govern-
ment authorities became suspicious about the identical bids. There are indications that the US 
government has recently begun using identical bidding as a basis for antitrust investigation. 
5. Strong Cartels
The cartel modeled in the last section was a relatively weak cartel. We now consider a 
stronger cartel, defined by two characteristics. First, it is able to exclude nonserious bidders 
(that is, bidders who could never win in a noncooperative auction but who might be attracted by 
the cartel's profits), so does not have to impose the no-entry constraint (6). Second, it is able to 
make transfer payments among its members. We shall find that side payments enable the cartel 
to achieve ef&iency, unlike the case of no transfers (Theorem 1), where efficiency was achieved 
only in the trivial case in which collusion did no better than noncooperative behavior.11 
An optimal cartel mechanism has the property that the bidder with the highest value wins if 
and only if his value exceeds r, and the seller receives r. The opti1nal direct mechanism that 
implements this is as follows. 
Theorem 3: The following mechanism is incentive compatible and efjlcient. Before the auction, 
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the cartel members report their valuations to the mechanism. If no report exceeds r, the cartel 
does not bid in the auction. If at least one bid exceeds r, the bidder making the highest report v 
obtains the item and pays a total of 
(7) T(v) � F(v)-n Jv (u-r)(n-l)F(u)"-1 f (u)du + r. 
r 
Each losing bidder receives from the winner [T (v )-r ]l(n-1), and the seller receives r. 
This mechanism has the property that all losing bidders receive a transfer; in particular, and 
in contrast to the previous section's mechanisms, bidders whose value is less than the minimum 
price earn positive profit. 
The cartel's optimal mechanism is not unique; there are many mechanisms yielding the 
same expected profit as a function of valuation. One mechanism corresponding to Theorem 3's 
mechanism has the cartel setting up an auction of its own. 
Corollary: The cartel can implement the mechanism of Theorem 3 by holding a prior first-price 
sealed-bid auction. If the highest bid in this prior auction exceeds r, the winner then bids r in the 
legitimate auction and pays each of the losers an equal share of the dijference between his bid in 
the prior auction and r. 
To prove this corollary, note that, in the new mechanism, bidding T(v) is an equilibrium, 
because, if all others bid T (v ), bidding T (v) in the new mechanism coincides with responding 
honestly in the direct mechanism; also, T (r)=r, so the minin1um price remains at r. 
The mechanism described in the corollary is remarkably similar to a collusive technique 
commonly used in practice. One cartel member is arbitrarily assigned to bid for the item without 
competition from his fellow cartel members. Aftetwards, the item is reauctioned among the car-
tel members (in the "knockout"). The cartel members then share a sum of money equal to the 
difference between the price reached in the cartel's own auction and the price reached in the 
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legitimate auction. Such a practice has been described in auctions of antiques, books, fish, 
timber, indusnial machinery, and wool by Cassady (1967, Ch. 13), Cooper (1977, pp. 35-38), 
Graham and Marshall (1984, 1985), and Halpern ( 1985).12 The only difference between this 
practice and the theoretical optimum is that the actual practice, by having the cartel's own auc­
tion after rather than before the legitimate auction, runs the risk of an inefficient outcome: the 
cartel might bid on an item and then discover that no member values it at more than the 
minimum price. It may, however, be possible to mitigate this inefficiency in practice: according 
to Halpern (1985, p.3), a cartel often gives its designated bidder "authority to use his discretion 
in the bidding based upon his knowledge of the market for the desired item."13 
Theorem 4: An efficient cartel mechanism has the property that the ivinner transfers to each of 
the losers an amount equal to 
(8) it(O) = 
E[v(2) - r Iv(!);, r] 
n 
where v (j) represents the )th order statistic and the expectation is taken over the distribution of 
the highest valuation. The winner's expected rent is this amount plus the rent he would have 
earned ifrhe auction had been noncooperative. 
If the bidding were noncooperative, the total expected profit earned by the winning bidder 
would be the expected difference between the highest valuation and the second- highest valua­
tion (given the highest valuation), because the bidding would drive the price up to the second­
highest valuation (see McAfee and McMillan (1987) for details). With collusion, the total 
expected profit earned by the cartel is the difference between the expe.cted highest valuation and 
the minimum price (given that this difference is positive), because the price paid to the seller is 
the minimum price. Thus the extra expected profit resulting from the cartel's activity, to be 
shared among the cartel members, is the difference between these two profit levels, or the 
expected second-highest valuation minus the minimum price. Theorem 4 has each of the cartel 
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members getting an equal share of this sum (including the winner, whose total payment includ­
ing his transfers to fellow cartel members is this amount less than what it would have been under 
noncooperative bidding).14 
In practice some cartels use sealed-bid auctions in the knockout (Halpern, 1985); but others 
use oral auctions (Cassady, 1967). However, in Theorem 4 it is essential that a first-price 
sealed-bid auction be used by the cartel; an oral auction would not work. This is because incen­
tive compatibility requires that the payment to the losing bidders does not depend on their actual 
values. The price reached in an oral auction is the actual second value; whereas in a first-price 
auction it is the expected second value given the highest value, which depends only on the 
winner's value. In an oral knockout auction, as Cassady (1967, p. 182) and Stigler (1966, p. 231) 
noted, a bidder might overbid to raise the final price and thereby raise the transfer he receives if 
he loses: in other words, the oral knockout is not incentive compatible. In particular, the use of 
the oral auction leads a bidder with value r to bid more then r destroying efficiency. This would 
result in the winner paying more for the item than if the bidding had been noncooperative. In 
contrast, if the knockout uses a sealed-bid auction, losing bidders cannot raise the price by over� 
bidding; instead they rationally bid the expected second-highest valuation conditional on their 
own valuation being the highest (as in an ordinary sealed-bid auction: see McAfee and McMil­
lan, 1987, for details), and thus the optimal mechanism of Theorem 3 is implemented. 
In some situations, incentive constraints can be relaxed by eliminating the requirement that 
side·payments sum to zero always, and just requiring that they suin to zero on average (cf. 
Groves, 1973, Holmstrom, 1982). This would in the case of a bidding cartel allow the cartel to 
distribute the surplus gained from colluding as a lump sum, instead of as a random payment 
depending on values, thereby eliminating some of the incentive effects in bidding. However, 
Theorem 3 shows that efficiency can be achieved without breaking the budget; there is nothing to 
be gained by employing a third party as a budget-breaker. Nevertheless, there is one advantage 
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to having a budget-breaker: the optimal mechanism can be implemented in dominant strategies. 
This is done by running the cartel's auction as a Vickrey auction, and having the budget-breaker 
return the expected surplus to all bidders as a lump sum. It appears to be impossible for the car­
tel to implement an efficient outcome as a dominant-strategy equilibrium without breaking the 
budget (compare with d'Aspremont and Gerard-Varel (1979)). 
6. The Seller's Response 
Whether the cartel is what we have described above as weak or strong, the effect on the 
seller is the same: the highest bid submitted equals the minimum price.15 Suppose the seller can 
somehow recognize that he faces organized bidders. What strategies can the seller use to 
counter the cartel? We shall discuss three types of strategy: raising the reserve price; keeping 
the reserve price secret; and interfering with the cartel's enforcement inechanism. 
What is the seller's objective function? If the seller is the government, concerned only with 
efficiency then, to the extent that collusive profits represent a pure transfer, the seller is 
indifferent about the the cartel's existence. Indeed, in this case, the government should prefer a 
strong cartel, using transfer payments, to a weak cartel, for this ensures the efficiency of the out­
come (cf. Theorems 1 and 3). However, if, as is realistically the case, government revenue is 
raised by distortionary taxation, then the collusive profits earned by the cartel cause a welfare 
loss: the government/seller would be concerned about the cartel's profits. Similarly, if the seller 
is a risk-neutral individual or firm, the objective would be to maximize own expected surplus. 
Let us assume from here on that this is the case. 
The seller can set the reserve price so as to mitigate the effects of the cartel (assuming he 
knows the number of cartel members). Let J(v)=v-[1-F(v)]if (v) and assume the standard 
regularity condition: J (v) is strictly increasing.16 The seller's expected return is 
(r-v 0)[1-F (r )n ], where v 0 is the seller's return if he fails to sell the item. Maximization of this 
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over r yields the optimal anti-cartel reserve price re, satisfying 
(9) 
1 - F(r,)" 
re - Vo - = 0. 
nF(r,)"-1f(r,) 
This is a special case of a result of Graham and Marshall (1987). The reserve price implied by 
(9) is higher than the optimal reserve price when the bidding is noncooperative, r n• defined by 
(10) r.- vo-
1-F(r.) 
f(r.) 
= 0. 
(Myerson (1981), Riley and and Samuelson (1981)). Thus the seller, upon discovering the 
bidders are colluding, raises his reserve price, setting it higher the larger the number of cartel 
members. 
The imposition of the anti-cartel reserve price re lowers the profits of the bidders. Indeed, 
if there are few bidders, collusive profits with the reserve price re may be lower than non-
cooperative profits with the reserve price rn. This is illustrated in Table 1, for F uniform on [O, 11 
and v o either 0 or 0.5. Profits under noncooperative bidding, implicit collusion, and explicit col-
lusion are listed for various numbers of bidders, n. Note that, for v 0=0, there must be at least 9 
bidders before detectable implicit collusion becomes profitable; for vo=0.5, there must be 19 or 
more bidders. 
This example suggests that the seller's determining his actions on the basis of his beliefs 
about whether or not a cartel exists will affect bidding behavior by both collusive and noncol-
lusive bidders. If the discount rate is low enough, an industry with fevv firms will have an incen-
tive not to collude, because current gains will be outweighed by lost future profits after the seller 
detects the collusion and raises the reserve price to its anti-cartel level. Paradoxically, Table 1 
suggests that, if the seller adjusts the reserve price optimally, collusion is more likely in indus-
tries with many firms than in industries with few firms. Also, the method by which the seller 
deduces he faces a cartel (for example observing a sequence of bids near the reserve price) will 
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affect the decision of the bidders on whether or not to collude. The threat of a higher reserve 
price may be enough to deter collusion. However, the dynamic equilibrium involving the threat 
of a raised reserve price and the bidders' optimizing responses to it is beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
Our analysis assumed that all bidders know the minimum price r. In practice, reserve 
prices are often kept secret; this is sometimes explained as an anti-cartel device. Should the 
seller announce r? There are two cases. First, suppose the seller's valuation Vo is common 
knowledge and it is a common knowledge whether or not the seller perceives himself to facing a 
cartel, so that all bidders know which of (9) and (10) apply. Then the bidders can deducer even 
if it is not announced: the seller is indifferent between announcing and not announcing. Second, 
suppose v0 is not common knowledge, or it is not common knowledge which of (9) or (10) the 
seller will use. Then there is one sense in which the seller gains by keeping r secret. For the 
bidders to be able to coordinate their bids, they must agree in their estimates of r. Not announc­
ing r forces the bidders to communicate in order to determine the level of the winning bid. The 
need for communication may make the cartel more fragile (cf. Section 3 above). There is, how­
ever, a question of whether a secret reserve price can be meaningful. For a reserve price to have 
any force, the seller must commit to it in advance of the bidding, setting it above his own valua­
tion v0. After the bidding, he may have an incentive to renege on this commitment; ex post, his 
best reserve price is equal to vo. If the reserve price is secret, the seller's reneging on his com­
mitment to it is not observable. It is not clear, therefore, that comntltment to a secret reserve 
price is possible. 
Suppose the cartel uses as its enforcement mechanism trigger strategies, revening to non­
cooperative behavior in some or all future auctions if a nondesignated bidder wins. Then, as a 
general rule, the seller should make the environment as stochastic as possible for the cartel, so as 
to cause the trigger to be set off accidentally: the seller might occasionally choose the wrong 
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bidder, for example (provided he does not reveal the winner's bid). Also, as Milgrom (1987) 
argued, trigger strategies work better in oral auctions than in sealed-bid auctions, for the punish­
ment for deviation comes immediately, instead of in the next auction. Thus a seller concerned 
about possible collusion should choose a sealed-bid auction rather than an oral auction. Finally, 
the larger the prize, the greater the temptation to defect from the cartel, because the effective 
discount rate is larger. In the case of contract bidding, this implies that it is better to offer a pro­
ject as a single large contract than to break it up into several smaller contracts. 
7. Conclusion
We have modeled bidding cartels that alternatively cannot or can make side payments 
among members. In each case, the effect on the seller is the same: just as if there were only one 
b_idder, the price paid is the minimum price. From the bidders' point of view, however, there are 
differences. With transfers, efficiency is achieved so that the bidders' expected profit is maxim­
ized. Without transfers, efficiency is not attainable; the winner is arbitrarily selected from those 
bidders who value the item at more than the minimum price. 
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port under Grant No. SES-8721124. 
1. Bidding conspiracies are prevalent enough to have added some exotic locutions to the 
English language. Canels are variously called rings, pies, and kippers. A schlepper is an insin­
cere bidder attracted solely by the canel's profits, and a shill is a phony bidder used by the auc­
tioneer to drive up the price. A knockout is a private auction held by the cartel to determine 
which member gets the item and how much he pays the other member�. 
2. On collusions not involving all bidders, and on collusion in English and second-price auc­
tions, see Graham and Marshall (1987), Mailath and Zemsky (1988) and von Ungern-Sternberg 
(1988). 
3. According to the US Justice Department's antitrust chief, bid-rigging by highway contractors 
increased the cost of building roads by 10% or more (New York Times, April 4 1988, p. 29.) 
4. See Geiss and Kuhlmann (1978), Hay and Kelley (1974), Posner (1976, p62) and Stigler 
(1964). 
5. In order to appeal to the repeated auction interpretation, we must assume that the bidders 
draw their valuations anew before each auction, so that it is the same private-information game 
that is repeated. For an alternative case, see Cramton and Palfrey (1990). 
6. The proof is as follows. Let a(w)=E-i hi(w,v_i) and b(w)= E_1T(w,v_i), so 
x(v,w) = va(w)-b(w). Note that 0 = Xw(v,v) = va'(v)-b'(v) is equivalent to (2). 
Differentiating 0 = 1tw(v, v) yields 0 = 1tvw(v,v) + 1tww(v, v), and therefore the necessary second 
order condition yields 0�1tvw(v, v), which is (3). To obtain sufficiency, note that 
1tvw(w,w) � 0 implies 1tvw(v,w) � 0 (v has dropped out) and thus 1tw(v,w);:::: Oas w �v. implying 
< > 
n(v, w) � n(v, v ). We shall abuse notation and write 1t(V) = max 1t(V, w) = rr(v, v ).
w 
7. A related problem is collusion in a Cournot oligoply when the firms' production costs are 
private information. This has been modeled by Cramton and Palfrey (1990) and Roberts (1985). 
8. All proofs are in the Appendix.
9. Remarkable precision can be achieved: for example, in one sealed-bid tender to a Canadian 
local government, all nine bids were for $6009.15 (Green, 1985, p.177). 
10. In a canel practice among bidders for government contracts in Europe described by the
Organisation for Economic CoMoperation and Development (1976, p.22), the canel is able to 
exclude what we describe as nonserious bidders: "No compensation is paid to firms suspected of 
panicipating in meetings of would-be tenderers held before the tender takes place simply in 
order to obtain compensation; ... compensation will be paid only if tenderers are in possession of 
a "claim": a tenderer obtains a claim after completing a building, for example. This claim may 
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be used only once. If a building contractor wishes to receive such compensation regularly he 
must ply his trade regularly." 
1 1 .  That efficiency can be achieved is perhaps surprising in the light of the result of Myerson 
and Satterthwaite (1983) that transfers do not guarantee efficiency in general bargaining situa­
tions when individual rationality is required. 
12. The first cartel convicted under the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, six cast-iron-pipe 
manufacturers, operated a knockout. In those cities not reserved for a particular finn, the price 
was fixed by a central committee (this is our r). Before a contract was let, the central committee 
accepted bids from the cartel members for the right to the contract. The highest bidder then bid 
the prearranged price in the legitimate auction, and the others submitted higher bids. The surplus 
was periodically distributed to the cartel members in proportion to their production capacities 
(Stigler, 1966, p. 230). 
13. In India, according to Wade(1987), the central government auctions the right to sell liquor 
in a village. Some villages (those that have succeeded in organizing for themselves a village 
committee) hold a prior auction among potential bidders. The winner then bids unopposed in the 
government auction. The village committee uses the difference between the village auction's 
price and the government auction's price to finance village-level public goods like the mainte­
nance of wells. Evidently, the villagers have found the optimal mechanism. 
14. Graham and Marshall (1987) model the use of a knockout with all losing bidders receiving 
equal side-payments in English and Vickrey auctions. Theorem 4 supplements their analysis by 
showing that the knockout with equal profits is the optimal mechanism for the cartel: there is no 
other mechanism, no matter how complicated, that does better. 
15. Collusion is common in the US Forest Service's auctions of federally-owned timber, 
because transponation costs mean that often only local mills bid (Mead (1967)). For instance, in 
the Ponderosa Pine region in the early 1980s, in 30% of the auctions the winning bid was within 
1 % of the reserve price. In some of these auctions only local firms bid; in others, there was com­
petition from outside firms. Consistent with the hypothesis that outside competition destroys col­
lusion among the local firms, in those auctions in which outsiders bid, the winning bid was 2 to 3 
times the reserve price (Mead, Schniepp, and Watson (1983)). 
16. This condition ensures that the seller does not use a stochastic policy: see Myerson (1981),
Masldn and Riley (1984), and McAfee and McMillan (1987). In tenns of the cases considered 
in Theorem 2, the assumption on J implies that H'(v) < 1;  thus the assumption underlying 
Theorem 2's identical-bidding result is weaker than the standard regularity condition. 
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TABLE 1 
Collusive Profits and Reserve Prices 
vo=O, rn=0.5 vo=0.5, rn=0.?5 
n re 7t; "' 1tn r, 7t; "' 1tn 
2 .58 .070 .077 .083 .77 .024 .025 .026 
3 .63 .046 .053 .057 .78 .019 .020 .022 
4 .67 .033 .039 .041 .80 .015 .017 .018 
5 .70 .025 .031 .Q30 .81 .013 .014 .016 
6 .72 .020 .025 .022 .82 .011 .012 .013 
7 .74 .016 .020 .017 .83 .009 .011 .Oil 
8 .76 .013 .017 .014 .84 .007 .010 .010 
9 .77 .Oil .015 .011 .84 .007 .008 .008 
IO .79 .010 .013 .009 .85 .006 .007 .007 
15 .83 .005 .007 .004 .88 .004 .005 .004 
20 .86 .003 .005 .002 .89 .002 .003 .002 
n=number of bidders; rc=anticartel reserve price; 1ti=implicitly collusive profit per firm (with 
reserve price re); 1te=explicitly collusive profit per firm (with reserve price re); 
n=noncooperative profit per firm (with reserve price rn); F is uniform on [0, 1]. 
Appendix 
Proof of the Lemma : 
In the noncooperative equilibrium of a first-price sealed-bid auction with reserve price 
r, it is well known that an agent with value v bids 
B(v) = v - F(vr-<n-l)JvF(u)n-1du (A.l)' 
(Myerson(1981), Riley and Samuelson(1981), Milgrom and Weber(1982), McAfee and 
McMillan( 1987) ). 
Since the probability of winning is F(v)11-1, this yields expected profit of Jv F(ur-1du, so 
' 
that by integration by parts ex ante expected profits (before values are known) are 
Ere = f1(1-F(u))F(u)11-1du. (A.2) ' 
Now incentive compatibility (2), efficiency (4), and zero profits for values at or below 
the reserve price imply that expected profits are 
r X;(U)f (U)dU = r X;(u)j (U)du 
fl 
dx· 
= -x;(u)[l-F(u)J 1 )  + -' [1-F(u)]du ' du 
= f1 11-F(u)]F(ur1du ' 
the same as noncooperative profit (A.2). 
Proof of Theorem 1: 
(A.3) 
Q.E.D. 
Because transfers are impossible and the minimum acceptable bid is r, any bidder with 
value less than r must make nonpositive profit. It follows that any scheme that allows 
bidders with values less than r to win is dominated by one where they lose, as 
A2 
f x;(v)fMdv �f of (v)dv + f x,(v)f(v)dv. 
Thus expected profits are 
E1t;(v) = f11t;(v)f(v)dv 
' 
I f' = -x,(v)[ 1-F(v)] I ,  + [1-F(v))E_,h;(v,v _;)dv. ' 
Thus the sum of expected profits is 
" 
E I:  1ti(v) = E '£ H (v;)h;(v;, v _;). 
i=I i=I 
(A.4) 
(A.5) 
(A.6) 
In the case H'(v)"?.O, the profit-maximizing scheme has the highest-value bidder winning 
if and only if his value exceeds r. By the lemma, this results in noncooperative profits. 
In the case H'(v)<O, the optimal collusive scheme maximizes total expected profits 
(A.6) subject to 
v, < r -? hi(v;,v_,) = 0; 
O � h;(v1,V-;); 
L h,(v;,v_;):S; 1;  
i - I 
iJ 
dv�-
1:,·_;h;(v;, v _;) ;::: 0. 
From (A.7) and (A.9) we have 
" 
E L  hi(V;,V-;) S 1 - [F(r)]11 i :::J 
Let µ1(v;) = E_;h1(v;, v _;). Then total expected profits are 
" f l 1-F(v) i: ---1 µ1(vi)f(vi)dv; i = l r  /(v;) 
" 
fl 
1-F(v;) f(v;) 
= ,;:111-F(r)) ,  I f(v;) ]µ;(v;)[ l-F(r) l dv; 
" fl 1-F(v;) f(v;) 
J 1 
f(v;) � ,;:p-F(r)] I, ( f(v;) )( l-F(r) )dv;] l, µ;(v;)(GF(r) )dv;J 
fl 1-F(v) fl " 
= [ ( ) )dv] [ L µ;(v;)f(v;)dv;] r 1-F(r r i=I 
(A.7) 
(A.8) 
(A.9) 
(A.10) 
(A. 1 1 )  
A3 
_ f' < 1-F(v) )dv] E_I:, h;(vi,v-1) - [ , 1-F(r) i=l 
< if' ( 1-F(v) )dv] (1-[F(r)]") - , 1-F(r) (A.12) 
The first inequality holds since [I-F(vi)ll/(v1) is decreasing and µ1(vi) is nondecreasing, 
(and thus the expected value of the product does not exceed the product the expected 
values). The second inequality follows from (A.11). 
One implementation of the bound on profits in (A.12) is for all bidders with values in 
excess of r to bid r, since profits are: 
fl 
II-I 1 1 
x, = [ (v-r)f(v)dv] l: -. -("j )[1-F(r)]i[F(r)]'-j-lr j=O j + l  
f
l 1 11-l 
= [ 11-F(v)Jdvl - .l: <A1 )[l-F(r)J;IF(r)J'-;-i r n 1=0 
= lf
'
[l-F(v)]dv] [ �( )] i (Z)[l-F(r)J'[F(r)]'-' r n 1- r k=l 
= .l f' ( l-F(v) )dv (1-[F(r)]') , n r 1-F(r) 
and summing achieves the bound. 
Proof of Theorem 2: 
Q.E.D. 
It is sufficient to show that maximum expected profits satisfy (A.6). From (2) and (6), 
{' x;(v)/ (v)dv = f x;(v)/ (v)dv 
= -1tj(V)[l-F(v)] I �  + f1 [1-F(v)]E_jhj(V, v _,)dv 
11 1-F(v;) r 
= E.l: f( ) h;(v,,v_,). 1 = !  Vj (A.13) 
That is, the constraint (6) means that the cartel maximizes the same objective function sub­
ject to the same constraints as in Theorem 1.  
Q.E.D. 
A4 
Proof a/Theorem 3:
Suppose the mechanism described in the theorem is operating and suppose a bidder 
with value v reports w. Since a report of w<r will never win and hence results in constant 
profit, we need only consider the case w�r. From (7), the bidder gets expected profits of 
Thus 
1t = [v-T(w)]F(w)n-1 + [l-F(w)"-1]J1 [ T(u)-r ] (n-l )F(u�du 
w n-1 1-F(w)n-1 
= rv-T(w)]F(w)"-1 + l1 [T(u)-r]F(u)11-2f(u)du. 
;: = [v-T(w)](n-l)F(wr'J (w) - T'(w)F(wr' - [T(w)-r]F(wr-2J (w) 
(A.14) 
� [(n-l)v-nT(w)--r]F(wr'J (w) - T"(w)F(wr-1 . (A.15) 
Since a:�: � o, incentive compatibility is characterized by 
ax 
aw 1 •=, = 0. (A.16) 
Now, from (7), 
�x 1 .=, = [(n-l)v-r-nF(vF'f'<u-r)(n-1)F(ur-1J(u)du-nr]F(vr2f(v) ow ' 
-F (vr' [-nF(v)-<<+1>1 Mf' (u-r)(n-l)F(ur'J (u)du I ' 
+ F(vF'[(v-r)(n-l)F(vr't (v)] 
= (n-l)vF(vr2/ (v) - nF(vF2f (v)f (u-r)(n-1)F(u)'-1f (u)du 
' 
-(n-l)rF (vr't (v) + nF (vF2f Mf' (u-r)(n-l)F (u)'-1! (u)du ' 
- (n-l)(v-r)F(vr'J (v) 
= 0. (A.17) 
Thus the mechanism is incentive compatible; it is clearly efficient. 
Q.E.D. 
A5 
Proof of Theorem 4: 
Note that, from incentive compatibility, 
Thus 
d1t = F(v)n-1 , if v <::: r. 
dv 
( ) 
[n(O) + J' F(u)'-1du , 
1t V = 1t(O) , r 
ifv ;?: r 
ifv < r 
where 7t(O) is the transfer received by each losing bidder . 
(A.18) 
(A.19) 
Moreover, the total rent earned by the cartel is the expected difference between the 
winner's value and r, where the density function of the winner's value is nF(v)"-1f(v). This 
total rent must equal total expected profits as in (A.20): 
- (v-r)nF(vr1J(v)dv = n(v)f (v)dv 1 J' tl n ' 
= n(O) + J'J'F(u)'-1duf(v)dv 
' ' 
= n(O) + f' [l-F(v)]F(vr1dv. 
' 
Hence the transfer to losing bidders is 
n(O) = J' (v-r)F(v)'-1 f (v)dv - J' [l-F(v)]F(v)'-1 dv 
= l_ f' [v- l-F(v)_r]nF(;r1J(v)dv 
n ' f(v) 
I = �E[v(2)-r lv(l)�r] , 
n 
(A.20) 
(A.21) 
where vv> represents the jth order statistic. In a first-price sealed-bid auction, bids equal the 
expected second value conditonal on own value. Since r is the price paid in the legitimate 
auction, the transfer to losers x(O) can, from (A.21), be interpreted as (lln)th of the difference 
between the winning bid in the cartel's sealed-bid auction and the bid in the legitimate auc-
ti on. 
Q.E.D. 
